Military Readiness Decline accelerating in 2006

According to a June 26, 2006, memo prepared by the staff of the House Armed Services Committee's Readiness Subcommittee for a closed-door hearing with uniformed representatives from each of the Armed Forces:

• Active and Reserve Army units in the United States lack the equipment and training to be ready to go to combat and are rated at the lowest possible ratings, known as "C-3" and "C-4."
• Despite claims that Army units actually going into combat in Iraq and Afghanistan are fully combat ready (rated at "C-1"), there may be an unknown number of units that are still "C-3" and "C-4" when they go to war.
• Because equipment is left in combat theaters for use there, it is unavailable for training in the United States. Thus, units preparing for combat cannot train properly for their core combat missions. There are also shortages of personnel in central military specialties, leading to "cross leveling" specialists from one unit to another as they deploy, thereby undoing one of the most meaningful reforms in the Army. "Unit manning" that enables human "cohesion" in combat units, a key driver of military effectiveness, is being unraveled by treating people as if they were interchangeable mechanical parts.
• Navy aircraft are being retired earlier than projected due to the stress on airframes from high operating tempos, thereby exacerbating modernization and readiness problems. The Navy's response has been, in part, to defer maintenance and underfund day-to-day operations, which would almost certainly worsen problems.
• In the Air Force, high usage rates also means that airframes are "aging" more rapidly and maintenance costs are increasing. The problems are exacerbated by shortages of maintenance personnel. As a result, the Air Force is experiencing readiness levels "at a historic low."

From other reports, such as from the Congressional Research Service, we also know that the United States currently spends more per deployed soldier and other per-unit war costs than ever before. Quite literally, increased per capita spending has resulted in lower readiness. Moreover, the high expense and low readiness result from a conflict that -- while highly dramatic in political and personal terms -- is actually quite small in terms of deployed forces compared to the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea.

As reported by journalist Elaine Grossman of Inside the Pentagon, the response from senior military leadership has been to provide explanations that appear to either ignore or contradict the evidence. To its credit, the Readiness Subcommittee held a closed door hearing on the matter, but it is entirely unclear what, if anything, the subcommittee, or anyone else in Congress, is doing to investigate seriously the dimension of the problem and to redress the apparent crisis.

To read Elaine Grossman's important article, click here: "House Memo: Army Unit Readiness for Iraq, Afghanistan Is Lagging" (http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/insider.asp?issue=762006sp.

The memo of the HASC Readiness Subcommittee, which has been circulating on Capitol Hill, can be read by clicking here (http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/HASC%20Readiness%20panel%20memo%20%2062606.pdf.

Note:The HASC subcommittee briefing paper is also available on this site in PDF format, and its background section (excluding the proposed questions for witnesses) is available here in HTML format.

Contact:   info (at) endthewarfirst.org
Invitation to join this effort