Introduction: Agreement History
In the U.S. occupation that followed the initial illegal invasion of Iraq in March 2003, it was necessary to establish a "legal" basis under which Multinational Force (MNF: essentially American and British) troops were to operate on Iraqi soil. This basis has progressed through a series of forms:
- United Nations Security Council authorizing resolutions -- these have consisted of:
- Two intial resolutions in May and August of 2003, acknowledging the on-the-ground reality of the occupation
- Three subsequent annaul re-authorizations in 2004, 2005, and 2006
- An expressly final re-authoriztion in 2007, to last through December 2008, different from previous resolutions because it was solicited by the al-Maliki government after it had been ordered by the Iraqi parliament to not seek such a reauthorization.
- The long-term "non-treaty" agreement -- The Bush administration, faced with the expressly final U.N. resolution, scheduled to last only through 2008, attempted to set up a long-term agreement to handle subsequent arrangements.
- An intial November 2007 draft agreement -- the Statement of Principles, followed by an op-ed defense by the Secretaries of State and Defense -- consisted of two parts:
- Status of Forces Agreement -- establishes a legal basis for U.S. military presence in Iraq, with the possibility of an endless occupation and "enduring" military bases;
- Strategic Framework Agrement -- lays out political, economic and cultural aspects of the U.S./Iraq relationship (including a controversial locking in of many of the original "100 Orders" laws laid out under the original Coalition Provisional Authority by L. Paul Bremer, which radically altered the economy and are viewed by many as tantamount to making Iraq a colony of the U.S.).
- While this agreement disappeared from the mainstream media for months, the legislative branches of both governments were becoming increasingly concerned that the executive branches were creating a long-term agreement consisting of problematic provisions about which they would have neither input nor approval.
- Legislatures -- The Iraqi Parliament was concerned about serious breaches of sovereignty, while some in the U.S. Congress were concerned about long-term military involvement tying the hands of the next President.
- Executives -- The al-Maliki government alternated between saying it would and would not seek parliamentary approval; the Bush administration claimed that the Status of Forces part of the agreement was like any other of the 90-some such agreements around the world -- not a treaty -- and thus did not require Congressional approval.
- The Bush administration ultimately pushed for -- and expressed confidence in -- a July 31 deadline for concluding negotiations. In June, the American demands became widely known in Iraq, and were widely seen as clear violations of Iraq sovereignty, and implied the use of Iraq in attacking other countries. A partial list of the original demands includes:
- an insistence on more than 200 U.S. facilities across the country
- U.S.authority to detain and hold Iraqis without turning them over to the Iraqi judicial system
- immunity from Iraqi prosecution for both U.S. troops and private contractors
- right of U.S. forces to conduct operations without approval from the Iraqi government
- right of U.S. access to Iraqi airspace and in-air-refueling
- U.S. not obligated to defend Iraq against agression, as envisioned in the original Declaration of Principles
- What's next? -- The political firestorm these created in Iraq could not be ignored by the al-Maliki government. The U.S. began to back away from some of these demands. But on July 7, the al-Maliki government "declared independence," saying it wanted a time-line for withdrawal of "combat troops," and the agreement negotiations broke down.
This page provides links to documents, news, and analysis concerning the various stages of this authorization agreement story.